



Abstract: In addition to our intended self-representations, 
our digital traces are being gathered by entities far beyond 
our control: government agencies, commercial companies, 
data brokers and possibly criminals. We have little or no 
access to these representations of us, although the data 
that shapes them comes from us. Foucault’s idea of the 
panopticon is frequently mentioned in discussions of 
surveillance, but the practices of surveillance are changing 
yet again. Employers and insurers are just starting to ask 
us to willingly agree to constant surveillance of certain 
aspects of our life: our driving or our health, and in return 
we are promised discounts if we prove ourselves worthy. 
How can we create a balance between using our machines 
to see ourselves and being forced to be seen by machines?
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Most of this book has been about how we as individuals create 
 self-representations of ourselves for our own use and to share with each 
other, but each of us is also represented by other entities in ways that 
we cannot fully access. Governments collect data about us, as do many 
different commercial companies. Data brokers combine information 
about each of us and sell profiles of us to other companies. Commercial 
websites like Facebook or Amazon generate representations of me based 
on my data. We live in a time that is teaching each of us that constantly 
being monitored is normal and even to our benefit.
In this final chapter I write about the times that photos of us are 
coerced and used as disciplinary tools. I write about data brokers and 
how commercial companies are gathering our data and creating their 
own self-representations of us that we are not allowed to see. Finally, 
I write about the ways surveillance and tracking are used as tools for 
power, showing how Foucault’s concept of the panopticon is changing as 
we today often knowingly allow ourselves to be watched.
Forced portraits
One of the most frequent reasons given for enjoying taking selfies is 
that it allows the subject full control over the photographic process, 
from deciding to take a photo, to choosing the angle and expression, 
to editing the image to choosing which photos to share with others. As 
Susan Sontag (1973) noted, ‘photography is power’ (8). Sontag writes, ‘To 
photograph is to appropriate the thing photographed. It means putting 
oneself into a certain relation to the world that feels like knowledge – 
and, therefore, like power’ (3). A few pages later she states, ‘There is an 
aggression implicit in every use of the camera’ (6).
Photos are regularly used against the subject’s will as a form of disci-
pline: police mugshots, the compulsory photographs non-US citizens 
undergo when entering the United States, driver’s license photographs 
and photographs taken by the police during riots. Personal photographs 
can also be co-opted by authorities, for example, in an immigration 
process when an immigrant may have to prove that a marriage or rela-
tionship is authentic by providing personal photographs of the couple 
together over a period of time. Failing to have the expected photographs 
means that you are seen as suspicious. Photographs are not only used as 
weapons or disciplinary tools by authorities, but can also become weap-
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ons that can be turned against authorities or against a peer. A bystander’s 
video of police brutality or a soldier’s photo of a man being tortured can 
lead to widespread condemnation of police actions or of military inter-
rogation practices. A nude photograph taken consensually during a love 
affair may be used for revenge after a breakup or for blackmail if it falls 
into the wrong hands.
Governments have kept census records about populations for many 
centuries. Today’s records are far more extensive.
Who the advertisers think I am
Your data is extremely valuable to companies that want to sell you things 
or to organisations that want to convince you to support their agenda. 
You can easily see some of the consequences of your data being tracked. 
For example, when I spent a lot of time reading about activity trackers 
as research for this book, I started seeing ads for activity trackers on 
many different sites, including Facebook. In addition to data gathered 
from your web surfing habits, sites such as Facebook and Google use the 
demographic information you explicitly give them and information they 
glean from your status updates, private messages and email to customise 
your news feed and the ads they show you. If you switch your status to 
‘Engaged,’ you will immediately be shown ads for wedding dresses and 
caterers. If you are a woman over 40, you will see ads for wrinkle cream 
and botox. The recently married will see ads about pregnancy and baby 
products, whereas those who have been married for a year without post-
ing anything about being pregnant will likely see ads for fertility aids.
Just tracking what you buy can tell marketers a lot about you, as we saw 
in the case reported in 2012 where Target sent a teenager ads for maternity 
clothes based on what she’d been buying (apparently pregnant women 
buy more vitamins and lotions in the first two trimesters than an average 
woman does), in practice announcing the girl’s pregnancy to her family 
before she had told them about it (Hill 2012). Sociologist Janet Vertesi 
(2014) wrote about how she tried to keep her recent pregnancy completely 
hidden from data brokers. It was a lot more complicated than you might 
think. She not only had to never mention the pregnancy on social media, 
even in private messages (which are also tracked for marketing data), but 
also couldn’t browse baby-related sites online or buy anything baby-related 
using a credit card. Avoiding being tracked and profiled by data brokers is 
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not easy to do. In Dragnet Nation, Julia Angwin (2014) writes about how 
she tries to keep her data private, and she concludes that to not be tracked 
you have to have very sophisticated technical knowledge or have a lot of 
money. As Vertesi points out, many of the strategies you might legitimately 
use to stay private – such as using encryption or using cash instead of 
credit cards – are also likely to flag you as a potential criminal.
The Timeline that Facebook introduced in 2011 is an interesting 
narrativisation of our lives, but it is also a goldmine for harvesting our 
‘life events’, from weddings and births to moving house or getting a 
new job – or even breaking a leg or having braces removed from our 
teeth. ‘Life events’ are valued by data brokers who gather data about 
us from multiple sources and sell it to marketers. If you can locate the 
exact people who will be most likely to buy your product, whether that is 
pregnant women or people who have just bought a new house, and you 
market directly to them, you are likely to sell more products.
You don’t even have to be online to have your data tracked. Compa-
nies track your purchases using loyalty cards or simply taking note of the 
credit card you use to make a purchase. There are companies that drive 
around taking photos of every car they come across and its license plate, 
creating a gigantic database of the location of millions of cars. The data is 
primarily intended for repossession of cars whose owners have not paid 
their car loans, but can also be used for many other purposes (Angwin 
2014, 27). If you have a digital thermostat or smoke detector made by 
Nest, a company purchased by Google in 2014, Google has access to 
continuous information about the temperature or CO2 levels in your 
home, which can for instance be used to track when people are present.
In Europe, privacy legislation limits the ways companies can use and 
connect personal data, and individuals have the right to see the data 
collected about them, but in the United States and many other coun-
tries commercial data collection is largely unregulated. The boundaries 
between government and commercial data collection are not always 
watertight. We know that the NSA gets data about us from commercial 
sites, and commercial data brokers add public data such as drivers 
license records or moving records to their data profiles of us. Some data 
we might think should be non-commercial, like data about children in 
public schools, is actually collected by private companies that run learn-
ing management systems, administer tests or provide educational soft-
ware. Using this data can help children learn more easily. For instance, 
software will easily be able to track whether an individual child tends to 
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persevere at a challenging task or whether he or she will give up quickly, 
and so the learning activities can be adjusted to that child’s learning 
style. But the use of this data is unregulated in many parts of the world 
and could be sold to marketers and data brokers.
When today’s six-year-olds finish high school, an astoundingly detailed 
representation of their lives at school will exist, and we don’t yet know 
who will be able to access it. Depending on which country children live 
in, they may or may not have the right to see their own records. Infor-
mation about their test scores, disciplinary issues, absences, tardiness, 
learning styles, health, home situation and personality from the time 
they were in preschool until they graduate may or may not be shared 
with marketers, insurance companies, potential employers, courts of law, 
the police and college admissions boards.
Dave Eggers imagines this data analysed in real time to produce continu-
ously updated rankings of all students in the United States. Why stop at 
saying that a six year old is in such and such a percentile for reading? If Ivy 
League colleges admit 12,000 students a year, wouldn’t parents love to know 
whether or not their child was in the top 12,000 students for their age? 
‘Once we get full participation from all schools and districts,’ the representa-
tive from the ubiquitous social network service The Circle enthusiastically 
explains in Eggers’s novel, ‘we’ll be able to keep daily rankings, with every 
test, every pop quiz incorporated instantly’ (Eggers 2013, 341).
With current EU legislation, the individual has the right to see his or 
her own records, but not necessarily in a useful format. When I requested 
my information from my Norwegian cell phone provider they sent me 
30 pages of printed times, dates, locations and phone numbers I had 
called over the previous three months. I assume it was printed rather 
than digital because it is far less useful to me on paper than in a format 
I could graph or analyse on a computer. Similarly, when I requested my 
hospital journals they were sent on paper, and I had to pay a fee for the 
photocopying. In the United States and many other countries individu-
als do not have the right to see data collected about them, although some 
companies will comply to some extent (Angwin 2014, 86–9).
Power and discipline
Foucault’s theories of discipline are often referenced both in discussions 
of surveillance and of selfies and self-representations. In discussions of 
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self-representation, theorists are interested in Foucault’s ideas about 
‘technologies of the self,’ which Foucault (1988) writes ‘permit individuals 
to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number 
of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and 
way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain 
state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality’ (18). In a 
study of NSFW (not safe for work) blogs where women and men shared 
erotic photos they had taken of themselves, Kathrin Tiidenberg (2014) 
invokes Foucault‘s self-cultivation, noting how an informant expressed 
that ‘self-shooting gave her a way to care for herself and increase her 
self-awareness.’ Through photographing herself, this woman developed a 
‘new gaze’ that ‘taught her to feel sexy in her body, but it also altered her 
material body-practices in terms of how she held herself, how she dressed 
and accessorized, whether she used make-up and how long she let her 
hair grow.’ Or as Jodi Dean (2010) glosses Foucault’s notion, ‘Foucault’s 
technologies of the self rely on the installation of a gaze, of the perspec-
tive of another before whom the subject imagines itself ’ (54). 
Surveillance scholars on the other hand rarely fail to mention 
Foucault’s theories of another aspect of power, a more direct gaze, or 
as Foucault (1988) writes: ‘technologies of power, which determine the 
conduct of individuals and submit them to certain ends or domination, 
an objectivizing of the subject’ (18).
Foucault wrote about Bentham’s design for a wheel-shaped prison 
building where the gaolers would sit in the middle and be able to see 
each prisoner in his individual cell around the perimeter of the circle. 
The prisoners would not be able to see each other and would always 
know that they might be being watched. That knowledge would keep 
them disciplined, always behaving as the gaolers required.
All that is needed, then, is to place a supervisor in a central tower and to 
shut up in each cell a madman, a patient, a condemned man, a worker or 
a schoolboy. By the effect of backlighting, one can observe from the tower, 
standing out precisely against the light, the small captive shadows in the 
cells of the periphery. They are like so many cages, so many small theatres, 
in which each actor is alone, perfectly individualized and constantly visible. 
The panoptic mechanism arranges spatial unities that make it possible to see 
constantly and to recognize immediately. In short, it reverses the principle 
of the dungeon; or rather of its three functions – to enclose, to deprive of 
light and to hide – it preserves only the first and eliminates the other two. 
Full lighting and the eye of a supervisor capture better than darkness, which 
ultimately protected. Visibility is a trap. (Foucault 1995, 200)
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This panopticon is also an image of our modern society, Foucault argued. 
Our government watches us, and in general, we don’t commit crimes 
because we know we could be caught. It is important that we know that 
we might be watched at any time, but that we can never know for sure 
whether we are watched now. ‘Power should be visible and unverifiable,’ 
Foucault wrote, ‘the inmate must never know whether he is being looked 
at at any one moment, but he must be sure that he may always be so’ 
(201). George Orwell’s novel Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949) describes this 
kind of intensely surveilled state perfectly.
In the decades since Foucault wrote about the panopticon, the nature 
of surveillance has changed greatly. We are watched to a far greater degree 
than when Foucault was alive, with surveillance cameras on every street 
corner and the NSA and many other entities able to access our emails 
or phone calls. It’s not clear that today’s surveillance functions in the 
regulatory way Foucault described, disciplining us to be well-behaved 
citizens. Surveillance has become complicated in the digital age. Even the 
word has been altered. Roger Clarke defined dataveillance (1988) as ‘the 
systematic monitoring of people’s actions or communications through 
the application of information technology’. Steve Mann and collabora-
tors coined other variations. Sousveillance plays upon the French word 
sous, meaning ‘under’, in contrast to sur which means ‘over’, and it refers 
to ordinary citizens watching authorities, for instance using wearable 
cameras. Coveillance is peers watching each other (Mann, Nolan, and 
Wellman 2003).
In his book The Googlization of Everything, Siva Vaidhyanathan 
argues that we need a new term to describe today’s surveillance, as it is 
fundamentally different from the panopticon Foucault described. Vaid-
hyanathan proposes the term cryptopticon. The most important thing 
about today’s cryptopticon, Vaidhyanathan (2011) writes, is that ‘we don’t 
know all the ways in which we are being watched or profiled – we simply 
know that we are. And we don’t regulate our behavior under the gaze 
of surveillance. Instead, we don’t seem to care’ (112). According to Vaid-
hyanathan, we don’t know all the ways in which we are being watched, 
but we know that they are extensive, and that we are watched by many 
different entities: governments, corporations and criminals.
In the years after Vaidhyanathan coined the term cryptopticon we have 
debated the Snowden leaks and had ongoing discussions of how Face-
book and other web services track us, and we actually know quite a lot 
more about how we are being watched. In many cases we know exactly 
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how we are being watched. For instance, several companies are now 
offering discounts on health insurance to employees who agree to wear 
a Fitbit activity tracker (Olson and Tilley 2014, Olson 2014). Progressive, 
a US car insurance company, offers its customers a device they call the 
Snapshot that will track their driving for 30 days, and promise a discount 
to drivers the Snapshot device finds drive less than average, in safer ways 
and at safer times of the day (Huffman 2013; Progressive 2014). Wild-
flower Health is a company that offers a pregnancy tracker, Due Date 
Plus, that is marketed to insurance companies and large employers. Due 
Date Plus is already offered to all women in Wyoming who are covered 
by Medicaid, and it seems very similar to many other pregnancy tracking 
apps available, letting you track weight and other measurements. There 
are some added benefits for users such as access to calling a nurse at 
any time of the day or night, but most importantly for the health care 
provider, the app ‘uses self-reported data to identify high-risk pregnan-
cies and drive interventions’ (DeGheest 2013). Maternity and newborn 
care are a major expense in health care, so if high-risk pregnancies can 
be caught early on, better care can be provided and a lot of money, and 
possibly lives, can be saved.
As Mae thinks in The Circle, ‘what had always caused her anxiety, or 
stress, or worry, was not any one force, nothing independent and exter-
nal – it wasn’t danger to herself or the constant calamity of other people 
and their problems. It was internal: it was subjective, it was not knowing’ 
(Eggers 2013, 194).
The fantasy of absolute self-knowledge through technology, backed up 
with the knowledge that the software will call in experts (doctors, nurses, 
hospitals) is very seductive. If my data shows me (and my insurer) that I 
am a safe driver, that I am doing a great job looking after my baby, or that 
I am walking 10,000 steps a day and doing my best to stay healthy, I will 
feel good about myself. If I can look at graphs showing that my weight 
gain during pregnancy is normal and that the baby is growing well I’ll 
feel safe. I might feel differently if I wasn’t able to keep up the 10,000 
steps my employer required or if I started admitting to my pregnancy 
tracker that I wasn’t getting enough sleep or was eating nothing but ice 
cream.
These apps are only the beginning. The technology is here, and we are 
just starting to find ways to use it. Remember the smart onesies and baby 
monitors I wrote about in the last chapter? Imagine if Wyoming Medic-
aid starts offering smart onesies to newborns that track breathing, sleep, 
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heart rate, temperature, feeding and more. Imagine if you start getting 
visits from child services if your baby doesn’t get enough sleep or there 
are other risk indicators. That might also save lives, but imagine parenting 
under constant government surveillance. These transactions – our data 
for a discount or for health care – will quite likely save lives, but it is very 
easy to see how they can be abused. And this technology is already here.
Seeing ourselves
When we willingly share data from an activity tracker, a safe driving 
monitor or a health app with our employer or insurer, we willingly trade 
our personal data in return for lower costs or better services. Sometimes 
we might appreciate being ‘seen,’ whether we feel that we are seen by the 
technology or by our health care providers or insurers. But, importantly, 
these apps allow us to see ourselves. As I discussed in chapter 5, stud-
ies have found that people develop ‘affective ties’ to the data they track 
(Oxlund 2012, 50; Ruckenstein 2014; Rooksby et al. 2014), just as our 
diaries, blogs, selfies and family photo albums are meaningful to us.
Apps which allow us to see our own data allow us to see ourselves. 
We look at our data doubles as we gazed into the mirror as teenagers 
wondering who we were and who we might be. We look at our data in 
much the same ways as you might flick through your selfies to find the 
one that shows you the way you want to be seen.
When Parmigianino painted his Self-Portrait in a Convex Mirror in 
1524, he painted himself exactly as he saw himself, using the best tech-
nology available to him. His image is distorted due to the convex shape 
of the mirror he used. Our self-representations are always distorted in 
some way. The data doubles that are generated by our health trackers or 
productivity apps are not complete or even entirely accurate likenesses 
any more than Parmigianino’s self-portrait was, although it may be 
harder for us to see how they are distorted.
Parmigianino’s self-portrait hangs in an art gallery nearly half a 
millennium after he painted it. Millions of people must have seen 
his self-portrait or a photograph of it over the years. But unlike our 
contemporary self-representations, it was not analysed by data brokers, 
search engines, marketers and governments. The audience for our self-
representations is no longer, as a few decades ago, ourselves and each 
other. Our audience today includes machines. The machines parse the 
 Seeing Ourselves Through Technology
DOI: 10.1057/9781137476661.0008
data we provide, running selfies through facial recognition software, 
our status updates through sentiment analysis software, our health data 
through risk indication analyses, and send the results on to marketers, 
employers, insurers or governments. Machines helped us create those 
self-representations in the first place.
And yet, we continue to express ourselves. We are humans, after all. 
‘Photography is power,’ Susan Sontag wrote (1973, 8). Selfies and other 
self-representations can be seen as a way of taking back this power, just 
as UPS drivers track their supervisors and protestors turn cameras on 
the police.
In practice, for now, we don’t think too much about our machine audi-
ences. We are too busy learning more about ourselves and each other by 
taking selfies, writing blogs, talking together on Facebook or Tumblr. We 
no longer need to rely on others to represent us. We represent ourselves.
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